Abstract-In the proposals for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) that are based on adapting the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol, the length of the one-time keys is limited (e.g. to 80 bits) by the low transmission rate. As a consequence, the hash function that is used to build the one-way key chain is constructed having a longer, secure hash function (e.g. SHA-256), preceded by a time-varying yet deterministic padding of the input and followed by a truncation of the output. We evaluate the impact of this construction on the collision resistance of the resulting hash function and of the whole chain, and show that with current proposed parameters, combined with the use of efficient hashing hardware, it can lead to a feasible attack with significant collision probability. The collision can be leveraged to mount a long lasting spoofing attack, where the victim receiver accepts all the one time keys and the navigation messages transmitted by the attacker as authentic. We conclude by suggesting possible modifications to make TESLA-based NMA more robust to such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, proposals for NMA based on various adaptations of TESLA have been published as potential candidates for a NMA capability on future open GNSS signals.
Such adaptations have been made to accomodate the limited bandwidth available on GNSS channels. These include the use of padding and truncation in the key chain generation function in order to reduce the size of keys and minimize the impact on bandwidth and associated authentication performances.
The predominant proposals based on TESLA [1] - [3] assume, without a formal analysis, that the modification of the key chain generation algorithm has a minimal impact on security and that the ideal behavior of the hashing function is preserved. This paper proposes a probabilistic model to assess the impact of the various adaptations of TESLA with deterministic padding and truncation on the security of the NMA schemes.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an overview of TESLA and adaptions of the protocol proposed in the literature for application to NMA in GNSS; Section III introduces a probabilistic model that describes the impact of modifications of the key chain generation algorithm on the entropy of keys and probability of collision; Section IV validates the model through empirical results obtained from an implementation with reduced key size; Section V describes an attack model for exploitation of the reduced entropy of keys; and Section VI provides design recommendations for improving the security of NMA based on TESLA with padding and truncation.
II. NAVIGATION MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION WITH TESLA
NMA uses cryptography to provide assurance of authenticity and integrity of the navigation message. It is a message that changes infrequently and is disseminated to the user at a low rate (e.g. 125 bps for Galileo E1B and 50 bps for GPS C/A and L1C), such that modulation of the message on the ranging signal minimizes impact on ranging, and provides adequate demodulation performance for users in a wide range of environments. In designing a performant NMA scheme, an optimal tradeoff needs to be found between security, authentication performances, communications overhead, robustness of the scheme (e.g. to channel errors and data loss), and requirements on the receiver.
Traditional authentication schemes based on digital signatures, tend to be unsuitable for such constrained dissemination channels due to the size of keys and/or signatures and the resulting impact on user authentication performances such as Time To First Authenticated Fix (TTFAF) and Time Between Authentications (TBA). For example, splitting digital signatures over multiple pages has an impact on reliability, requiring error-free demodulation of successive pages in order for authentication to be available. In addition, they tend to impose a high computational overhead on the receiver.
Several proposals for NMA in the literature [1] - [5] have considered variations on broadcast authentication protocols such as TESLA. This protocol uses symmetric cryptography, minimizing the computational overhead of the receiver, and is flexible in that it can be configured to meet a range of requirements in terms of bandwidth and authentication performances. A distinctive characteristic of this protocol is the computation of a L-step one-way key chain by the sender (L repeated applications of a one-way function to k L , a randomly selected secret, up to k 0 ) and the delayed disclosure of keys in the reverse order of generation (i.e. last key k 0 disclosed first, and k L as last). The user is able to authenticate each disclosed key using a previously authenticated key or the root key k 0 . This means that if an intermediate key is lost, the user can recover the chain using keys disclosed later.
Asymmetric encryption techniques (e.g. digital signatures) are typically used to authenticate the root key of a given chain. When a key is disclosed in the current time-slot, the user first authenticates the key against an already authenticated key chain, and then uses the key to verify a Message Authentication Code (MAC) received in an earlier time-slot. The MAC provides data origin authentication as well as data integrity for part or all of the navigation message. Time synchronization is critical, where time stamping of received messages (keys and MACs) ensures the receiver does not accept a forged message with a key that does not correspond to the correct time-slot.
The original TESLA proposal by [6] , targeted source authentication for multicast Internet applications (see RFC4082 [7] ). The protocol as proposed in RFC4082, does not provide suitable performances over a constrained GNSS dissemination channel such as the Galileo Open Service (OS). Many NMA proposals in the literature [1] - [3] have one adaptation in common, modification of the key chain generation function to reduce the size of keys and the associated bandwidth. These proposals achieve reduction of key size by truncating the output for each iteration of the key chain generation function (e.g. the 80 MSBs of a 256-bit output, assuming SHA256 as the oneway function) and introducing a deterministic padding at the input of the next iteration. Some proposals add a time-variant component (the 32-bit representation of the Galileo System Time (GST)) in the padding, to each iteration of the generation function, thereby limiting the possibility of an adversary to attack the key chain by pre-computing chains.
While such modifications are made to tailor the scheme to the required authentication performances given the constraints of the dissemination channel, their impact on the security of the scheme needs to be evaluated. Some concerns were raised on the security of applying TESLA to the GNSS context [8] , focusing on the problem of guaranteeing the required time synchronization; however, potential vulnerability introduced by the reduced size key chain was not addressed. The following sections investigate the impact of padding and truncation on the entropy of keys generated by the key chain generation function, as well as the impact of including the GST as a time-variant component in each iteration. A theoretical model is presented and validated empirically, providing a useful tool for designers of NMA schemes for determining the impact of modifications on the effective security of the key chain.
III. PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE ONE-WAY KEY CHAIN
The (possibly time varying) n-bit hash function in the TESLA key chain is built as illustrated in Fig. 1a , by cascading 1) a possibly time-varying, yet deterministic padding to increase the length from n to m > n bits 2) a secure cryptographic hash function with m -bit inputs and m-bit outputs, taken from a well established cryptographic library 3) a truncation of the secure hash output to n bits A security analysis of the hash chain would require to evaluate the effectiveness of the hash function, in terms of uniformity of its output, by exhaustively generating all 2 n input/output pairs, for each possible value of the time varying parameter GST(t). Clearly this is not feasible even for moderate values of n, so for the sake of tractability, we replace the explicit construction with a probabilistic model.
In particular, we model the m → m bit secure hash function as a one-to-one function, thus assuming m ≤ m. This represents an idealization of the actual hash function, in that we neglect the possibility of having collisions, since we we are interested in the additional collisions that may be introduced by concatenation with padding and truncation. A more pessimistic choice would be to model the hash function as a random oracle. On the other hand, since the m-bit secure hash function was not designed to have a uniform output when truncated to n bits with arbitrarily padded n-bit inputs, we consider that in this respect it is as good as any other m -bit to m-bit, one-to-one, map. Therefore, we model it as a random function h, uniformly drawn from the set of all one-to-one functions with the same input and output sets. Correspondingly, the time-varying padding is modeled as a deterministic oneto-one map, while the truncation is a many-to-one map. The resulting model is represented in Fig. 1b .
Under the simplifying model assumptions that
This holds even more so if h is itself modeled as a random oracle.
i ({b}) the cardinality of the preimage of b under f i , and
Modeling f i as a random oracle, the random vector Figure 1 : (a) construction of a n → n bit hash function for the TESLA key chain starting from a m → m secure hash function with m, m > n, as proposed in [3] ; (b) probabilistic model for its security analysis and the marginal distribution of each
For N 1 the (N, 1 N ) binomial distribution can be approximated by a Poisson distribution with unit mean
c!e On the other hand, the random variable J i,L (b) can be written through a backward recursion on i as
If the f i are also modeled as independent, and we take into account the fact that
N with high probability, the K i (b) random variables J i+1,L (a) in the sum above can be viewed as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and independent of K i (b), so that J i,L (b) has a compound Poisson distribution, with mean and power given by
Starting from J L,L (b) = 1, and by applying the recursive relations above, we obtain
and is itself a random variable. We then obtain its expected value
and observe that it increases linearly by each step of the chain, as long as L N . Compare this to the ideal case where
Another
where χ A denotes the indicator variable of event A. The mean of N i is then
where one can again use the properties of the compound Poisson distribution to derive the recursive relationship
with the initial value p J L,L (0) = 0. From (2), and by Jensen inequality, one can also derive an upper bound on the equivocation (conditional entropy) of each key k i given the hash functions
A numerical evaluation of the collision probability (1) and the entropy bound (3) is shown in Fig. 2 for the TESLA parameters proposed in [3] where n = 80 bit, m = 256 bit and key k i is released at time t i = t 0 + iT k , with T k = 0.25 s the key release period.
IV. NUMERICAL VALIDATION OF THE MODEL
This Section compares results from Section III with those obtained by a numerical implementation.
Due to computational burden only shorter key lengths (i.e. n = 16 and n = 24 bits) were evaluated, using a standard SHA256 as the internal secure hash function in starts from all the 2 24 possible inputs, truncating the output of the hash function to 24 bits for each iteration.
In Fig. 3 , a comparison of the predicted versus experimental collision probability is provided, taking into account a truncation to n = 16 bits with and without the time-variant padding, and n = 24 bits with time-invariant padding only for computational limitations. The figure illustrates a perfect correspondence between the predicted and experimental values for the 16-bits time-variant key generation algorithm case. At the beginning of the key chain a good agreement can be observed also for the versions with time-invariant padding, while a difference can be observed only after 400 steps for 16-bit keys, and after 2000 steps for 24-bit keys. This discrepancy is due to the fact that in this case the hash function remains the same at each iteration and it is poorly modeled by the assumption of independence between the f i . In fact, after a certain number of iterations the chain reaches a limit cycle, the image f L i (N ) remains identical, and the output distribution with uniform input becomes stationary. Clearly, the longer is the key, the more iterations are needed to reach this situation, thus the model remains valid for more iterations also in the presence of time-invariant padding. Fig. 4 reports the comparison between the experimental and the theoretical numbers of unique output N i after every iteration, for respectively 24-bit time-invariant and 16-bit timevariant/invariant key chain. Once again, the average results match the predicted ones when a time-variant function is used, and the model is a good approximation for the initial iterations of the time-invariant key generation algorithm.
V. ATTACK MODEL
We consider an attack that aims at spoofing the navigation message for a time duration T A = T k , beginning at t i , i.e. at having the victim accept consecutive keys and the corresponding forged messages and MACs as authentic. 
Collision probability E[pc]
Model, n = 16 bits Experimental, n = 16 bits, time-variant Experimental, n = 16 bits, time-invariant Model, n = 24 bits Experimental, n = 24 bits, time-invariant Figure 3 : Comparison between predicted and experimental collision probability after each iteration. To this purpose, the attacker tries to findk i+1 , . . . ,k i+ such that f i (k i+1 ) = k i , and
To this aim, he can pick N A random, and independent values within N as guesses for k i+ , His choice of N A is constrained by the computational power that is available to him (in terms of hashing rate R h , i.e. the maximum number of hashes he can compute per unit time, and memory required to buffer the pre-computed values) and the amount of time T that he is willing to devote to the attack computation.
Note that the key valuesk i+1 , . . . ,k i+ computed by the attacker may be different from the corresponding ones computed by the system, and the attack is still successful, as long ask i is equal to k i . In fact the attacker aim is not to find the exact key sequence released by the system, but any sequence that passes the verification.
The success event for this attack can therefore be written as
where the success event for a single guess i is
Observe, that owing to the independence of random guesses, the single success events are independent and equally likely. Then, under the assumption that P [S j (i, )] 1/N A , the success probability of the attack is well approximated by its union bound:
Similarly to the derivation of the collision probability in Section III, we observe that, conditioned on the actual realization of f i+ i , thek j i are i.i.d. and independent of k i with probability mass distribution
N Then we can evaluate the conditioned single attempt success probability
On the other hand, one can recursively write the product as
where all the sum indices a, a run over f
The first sum in (7) yields again a compound Poisson variable, whereas in each term of the second sum, J i+1,L (a) and J i+1,i+ (a ) are independent, so we obtain the recursion
which, together with the starting point J i+ ,i+ (b) = 1, ∀b, yields the result
We then obtain the average single attempt success probability as
Combining (5) with the constraint on computational power, N A = R h T / , we can write
showing that the success probability of the attack is bounded away from zero as → ∞. On the contrary, for an ideal key chain generation algorithm, where each f i is one-to-one (i.e. a permutation of N ), the only possible success for the attacker is to correctly guess the exact key used by the system, k j i+ = k i+ , which leads to a success probability
vanishing as → ∞. A comparison between (8) and (9) clearly shows that the use of padding and truncation has a severe impact on the security of the scheme. An important outcome of this work is that, from a sufficiently high value of , attacking the system for a longer time does not require more computational power to obtain the same success probability, due to the non ideal key generation function. Therefore, with the same effort required to attack few iterations, it is possible to compromise the entire length key chain. Fig. 5 reports the success probability computed using (8) for system parameters that match the one proposed in [3] (key length n = 80 bit, key release rate 1/T k = 40 keys every 10 s) for an attack computation time T = 30 days and a computational power R h = 5 · 10 13 hash/s. It is noteworthy that such a computational power can be obtained for less than US$10,000 using Bitcoin mining hardware (that it based on SHA256) [9] .
VI. DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
The probabilistic model presented in this paper provides the mean collision probability and an upper bound on the expected entropy of keys generated using a key chain with padding and truncation at each iteration. This model can be used by designers of NMA schemes as a tool to optimize parameters of a one-way key chain generation algorithm for security.
The following recommendations are made for NMA schemes based on the use of one-way key chains with padding and truncation.
• Key size: the key size should take into consideration the loss of entropy caused by the truncation. The model proposed can be used to find an adequate key size. Moreover, longer keys will be less impacted. Another aspect that should be investigated is the use of cryptographic primitives (e.g. hash function) carefully designed for smaller block size.
• Time-variant padding: the use of time-variant padding (e.g. GST) is strongly recommended as the addition of a time varying component will change the output set and its distribution at every iteration. This significantly limits the attacker's ability to determine the probability distribution of N L−i and therefore provides protection against pre-computation attacks.
• Use short chains: the more iterations performed, the greater the loss of entropy.
• Minimize the frequency of key disclosure: the beginning of the key chain (last value released) is impacted by the largest reduction of entropy. This is evident in Fig. 2 , which illustrates that the most significant reduction occurs within 5 hours (i.e. starting from 80 bits, 15 bits of entropy are lost after approximately 16,400 iterations). It should be noted that the 10 seconds time-slot is constrained by the maximum verification delay, and ultimately by the target Time To Alarm (TTA). However, releasing a single key instead of 40 keys every slot would result in this reduction occurring in 8 days instead of 5 hours. Observe that the chain is used in reverse order of generation, and keys with much lower entropy than the ideal case are used for the majority of the chain duration. Therefore, only the last few keys to be disclosed will approach the full entropy for the key size.
• Vary the padding at every iteration: the use of the same padding for more than one iteration may not be ideal and could potentially lead to additional vulnerability.
• Randomize the parameters used: avoid the use of predictable parameters in the key chain generation algorithm.
Varying parameters such as the start epoch and duration of key chains, can provide additional protection against pre-computation attacks.
• Disclose parameters for key chain generation as late as possible: delaying the disclosure of key chain generation parameters can provide additional protection against precomputation attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced a probabilistic model for evaluating the security of NMA schemes based on the use of one-way key chains. The model specifically addresses the use of deterministic padding and truncation in each iteration of the key chain generation algorithm, and considers the inclusion of time varying information as part of the padding. An analysis of the model and validation using empirical results has been provided. An effective attack has been introduced and its success probability has also been quantified using the model, highlighting how an attacker can successfully exploit the reduction of entropy as a result of deterministic padding and truncation in key chain generation. The model effectively provides an estimated collision probability and an upper bound to the entropy of keys generated. It can support designers of NMA schemes in finding an appropriate tradeoff between performance and security through the optimization of parameters related to key chain generation. The paper concludes with several design recommendations.
